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ABSTRACT 
There is a lot of talk about making our food system more “sustainable,” 
and eco-consumers—those who consider environmental sustainability as an 
important purchasing priority—are making themselves heard. This growing 
consumer segment is rapidly gaining national attention for moving more 
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sustainable products to the market, and for its willingness to pay more for 
these options. However, while economists normally predict that higher 
prices lead profit-minded suppliers to enter a market to meet a new and 
growing demand, this transition is not occurring at the pace one would 
expect. 
This Article argues that land tenure status—whether a farmer rents or 
owns his/her land—prevents the adoption of sustainable practice. Renters 
adopt fewer sustainable practices on the land, not because there is anything 
inherent in farmland rental that results in inferior environmental 
stewardship, but because legal agreements between the landlord and tenant 
do not incentivize sustainable practices. In order to feed the eco-consumer 
and motivate sustainable practice adoption, renters need incentives to adopt 
sustainable practices. Incentives to produce sustainably are vital given that 
10% of farmers are due to retire in the next 20 years, placing more land in 
tenancy and into the hands of landlords with little farming experience. 
Academics have given little attention to asking how sustainable 
practices will be preserved in the next century with these land-tenure trends 
in mind. This Article uniquely combines classical economic theory with 
U.S. Census of Agriculture farming practice data to expose gaps in existing 
policy and incentivize renters to adopt sustainable practices. In an era of 
limited federal regulatory power, this Article focuses on private sector 
solutions found in contracting, conservation initiatives, certification 
systems, ecosystem markets, and conservation easements. 
I. INTRODUCTION: SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR “SUSTAINABLE” FOOD 
The sustainable shopper is here. While food consumers predominantly 
shop with taste, safety, and price in mind,1 more admit to reading labels,2 
and to aligning food purchases with personal values.3 Eco-labeling is on the 
rise as “a recent Consumer Reports survey of 1,050 people found that 
pesticides are a concern for 85 percent of Americans.”4 More and more 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Food Demand Survey (FooDS), OKLA. ST. U. (July 16, 2017), 
http://agecon.okstate.edu/files/August%202017.pdf (utilizing a monthly online survey, FooDS follows 
consumer trends on “safety, quality, and price of food at home and away from home with particular 
focus on meat demand”). FooDS’s sample size consists “of at least 1,000 individuals, weighted to match 
the US population in terms of age, gender, education and region of residence.” Id.   
 2. Nutrition 101: Consumers Actually Do Read Product Labels, FORBES (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thehartmangroup/2016/07/20/nutrition-101-consumers-actually-do-read-
product-labels#73ae122a45e6. 
 3. See DELOITTE, CAPITALIZING ON THE SHIFTING CONSUMER FOOD VALUE EQUATION 1–2 
(2016) (detailing how consumers’ “traditional drivers” have been evolving). 
 4. Eat the Peach, Not the Pesticide, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health/natural-health/pesticides/index.htm. 
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consumers are discovering that agricultural practices reduce soil 
productivity, raise levels of water and air pollution, increase water scarcity, 
destroy insect species, contribute to climate change, reduce genetic 
diversity by using genetically modified crops,5 alter human systems with 
toxic food residues, and decrease antibiotic resistance.6 As more violations 
of environmental standards reach the popular press, social media, and the 
courtroom,7 consumers are searching for foods grown using sustainable 
practices––“method[s] of harvesting or using a resource so that the resource 
                                                                                                                 
 5. In November 2015, the FDA announced “the first approval for a genetically engineered 
animal intended for food, AquAdvantage Salmon.” Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA 
Takes Several Actions Involving Genetically Engineered Plants and Animals for Food (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170721213214/https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Pre 
ssAnnouncements/ucm473249.htm. The FDA declined petitions from Earthjustice and several other 
environmental groups requesting that the agency first prepare an Environmental Impact Statement 
before approving AquAdvantage Salmon for market. Letter from Leslie Kux, Assoc. Comm’r of Pol’y, 
Food & Drug Admin., to Khushi Desai, Earthjustice (Nov. 19, 2015) (on file with Vermont Law 
Review). 
 6. See generally SUSAN SCHNEIDER, FOOD FARMING AND SUSTAINABILITY 645 (2011) 
(describing briefly the history of antimicrobial resistance); see also Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, 
Inc., 805 F.3d 685, 686, 689–90, 695 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that the Clean Air Act does not preempt 
common law claims alleging negligence, nuisance, and trespass against a whiskey distiller); Nat. Res. 
Def. Council v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 760 F.3d 151, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2014) (challenging the 
FDA’s refusal to hold a hearing prior to allowing drug manufacturers to sell antibiotics for use in animal 
feed because of the dangers posed by such antibiotics in the food supply); Mendoza v. Monsanto Co., 
No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2016 WL 3648966, at *1, *5 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2016) (denying a motion by 
Monsanto to dismiss a lawsuit brought by an individual who claims to have developed non-Hodgkin 
lymphoma as a result of using Monsanto’s Roundup product); Sheppard v. Monsanto Co., Civ. No. 16-
00043, 2016 WL 3629074, at *1, *11 (D. Haw. June 29, 2016) (denying Monsanto’s motion to dismiss 
a claim that Roundup caused the plaintiff’s non-Hodgkin lymphoma); Duarte Nursery, Inc. v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 2:13-cv-02095, 2016 WL 4717986, at *20 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2016) 
(concluding that farming activities resulted in a violation where those activities were either “not part of 
an established and ongoing farming activity,” or where those activities impact the flow of water in a 
wetland); M. Sean High, Legal Settlement: Syngenta Agrees to Pay $1.2 M. for Selling Misbranded 
Pesticides, PA. ST. AGRIC. L. BLOG (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.pennstateaglaw.com/2016/09/agricultu 
ral-law-weekly-reviewseptember_22.html (“[T]he agency has reached a settlement agreement with 
Syngenta Crop Protection . . . for allegedly violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act through the repackaging, selling and distribution of unregistered and misbranded pesticides.”).  
 7. While historically environmental challenges to food production centered on water 
pollution, new litigation challenges the use of antibiotics in animals, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014), the use of genetically modified crops, Briseno v. 
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Briseno, 138 
S. Ct. 313 (2017), and new sources of air pollution from agricultural activities, Waterkeeper All. v. 
EPA, 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Many of these cases do not implicate farmers, but some do (i.e., 
nuisance claims). For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the environmental 
organization challenged FDA’s refusal to hold a hearing prior to allowing drug manufacturers to sell 
antibiotics for use in animal feed because of the dangers posed by such antibiotics in the food supply. 
760 F.3d at 157–58; see also Kux, supra note 5 (questioning the FDA’s failure to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the approval of food-grade, genetically altered salmon). 
570 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 42:567 
is not depleted or permanently damaged.”8 While some consumers go to 
great lengths to search for foods and ingredients,9 others use smartphone 
applications that scan bar codes and identify sustainable ingredients as they 
shop.10 
Food retailers are guided by research showing that companies can 
expect a healthy return on investment from environmental and socially 
sustainable products and that consumers, especially millennials, are the 
“most willing to pay extra for sustainable offerings.”11 Private certifications 
such as “organic,” “cruelty-free,” “natural,” “fair trade,” “hormone free,” 
“pesticide free,” and “free range”12 have made it to mainstream retail 
environments. Retailers exemplifying this trend include Walmart’s example 
to offer and source more sustainable foods,13 and Amazon’s recent Whole 
Foods acquisition.14 Amazon is a retailer for the masses, whereas Whole 
Foods is a retailer tailored to eco-shoppers.15 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Sustainable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2007). 
 9. See Lauren R. Hartman, First-Ever Plant Based Foods Association Forms, FOOD 
PROCESSING (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.foodprocessing.com/industrynews/2016/first-ever-plant-based 
-foods-association-forms/ (demonstrating that consumers can eat less meat or meat alternatives, from 
tofu and tempeh to dairy replacements and vegan foods because, this year, a plant-based foods 
association formed to promote plant-based protein products). 
 10. Make Smart Shopping Choices from Your Smartphone with Sustainable Shopper App, 
CINCINNATI ZOO & BOTANICAL GARDEN (Apr. 18, 2012), http://cincinnatizoo.org/blog/2012/04/18/ma 
ke-smart-shopping-choices-from-your-smartphone-with-sustainable-shopper-app/; see also John Still, 
Top 10 Sustainable Food Apps, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/sustainable-food-apps-smartphone-menu (listing sustainable food apps for consumer use). 
 11. Green Generation: Millennials Say Sustainability Is a Shopping Priority, NIELSEN (Nov. 5, 
2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/green-generation-millennials-say-sustainabilit 
y-is-a-shopping-priority.html. 
 12. See THE TRUE COST (Untold Creative, LLC, 2015) (demonstrating mainstream awareness 
of fair trade by showing a company’s adoption of this certification). 
 13. Dan Charles, Can Anyone, Even Walmart, Stem the Heat-Trapping Flood of Nitrogen on 
Farms, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/08/21/54422945 
8/can-anyone-even-walmart-stem-the-heat-trapping-flood-of-nitrogen-on-farms (“According to one 
study, carried out by the consulting group Deloitte, greenhouse emissions from fertilizer are the biggest 
single piece of the global warming price tag for almost half of the top-selling items on the shelves at 
Walmart.”). 
 14. Nick Wingfield & Michael J. de la Merced, Amazon to Buy Whole Foods for 13.4 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/business/dealbook/amazon-whole-
foods.html. 
 15. See Lauren Thomas, Amazon’s 100 Million Prime Members Will Help It Become the No. 1 
Apparel Retailer in the US, CNBC (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/19/amazon-to-be-
the-no-1-apparel-retailer-in-the-us-morgan-stanley.html (“Brands are plugging the department store 
‘leaky bucket’ hole with growth on Amazon.com.”); Environmental Stewardship: Our Green Mission, 
WHOLE FOODS MARKET, https://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/mission-values/environmental-
stewardship/green-mission (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (explaining how Whole Foods’ passion for 
healthy food coincides with its passion for a healthy planet). 
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As consumers and retailers demand more sustainable foods, 
economists would normally predict that supply would follow: that farmers 
would be eager to produce for these value-added markets.16 This is not 
necessarily the case, however. For some farmers, there are barriers to 
producing more sustainable food—barriers that extend beyond the usual 
agricultural production constraints, such as access to inputs like seeds and 
technology.17 One seldom discussed barrier to producing more sustainable 
food is a legal constraint: the relationship the farmer has with the land, 
otherwise known as the “land tenure” status.18 “The word tenure comes 
from the Latin tenir, which means ‘to hold,’” and the dominant forms of 
land tenure in the United States are private ownership and tenancy, each 
with its own laws, customs, and legal arrangements.19  
The problem is that tenants, in contrast to private owners, adopt fewer 
sustainable practices on the land, not because there is anything inherent in 
farmland rental that results in inferior environmental stewardship, but 
because landlord-tenant legal agreements do not typically incentivize 
sustainable practices. There is historical support for this incentive structure. 
Most of our history held the ideal tenure status to be full owner 
operatorship, reasoning that tenants and absentee landlords, without strong 
roots to the land, will not take as good care of the land as landowner 
operators.20 This view was based on the Dust Bowl experience of the late 
1930s, when severe dust storms and drought coupled with a lack of wind-
erosion prevention, dryland-farming techniques, and severely damaged the 
ecology of American prairies.21 Over time, farmers either voluntarily 
abandoned their land, or lost it to bank foreclosure, leading to “the largest 
migration in American history. By 1940, 2.5 million people had moved out 
of the Plains states; of those, 200,000 moved to California.”22 The 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Jonathan C. Carlson, Strengthening the Property-Rights Regime for Plant Genetic 
Resources: The Role of the World Bank, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 111–12 (1996). 
 17. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the challenges of adopting sustainable farming 
for farm tenants who rent the land they farm). 
 18. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The 
Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 
436–37 (2004). 
 19. ROBIN KOHANOWICH ET AL., FARMLASTS PROJECT: AGRICULTURAL LAND TENURE:  A 
CURRICULUM FOR BEGINNING FARMERS AND FARM SEEKERS 3, www.uvm.edu/farmlasts/FarmLASTS 
AgLandTenure.pdf (last modified Feb. 24, 2010). 
 20. See id. at 4–5 (tracing the “Jeffersonian ideal” of dispersed private land ownership through 
American history). 
 21. See Timeline: The Dust Bowl, PBS, [hereinafter Timeline: The Dustbowl], 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features /dust-bowl-surviving-dust-bowl/ (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2018) (describing the effects of the dust storms and drought on fertility and quality of soil). 
 22. Mass Exodus From the Plains, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/feature 
s/surviving-the-dust-bowl-mass-exodus-plains/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2018). 
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prevailing thought was that drought and storms, huge migration, and 
resulting high rates of absentee ownership and tenancy, all exacerbated the 
loss in valuable topsoil, the fertile base upon which successful agriculture is 
grown. Subsequently, land tenancy was negatively perceived and actively 
discouraged.23 
Following the Dust Bowl, “[c]hanging land tenure patterns” from 
absentee landlords and tenants to farm owner-operators “were considered as 
important as soil conservation programs in stopping the serious rates of soil 
erosion.”24 “Congress declare[d] soil erosion ‘a national menace’ in an act 
establishing the Soil Conservation Service in the [U.S.] Department of 
Agriculture” (USDA) to “develop extensive conservation programs,” some 
of which incentivized farmers with payments.25 The program included 
“strip cropping, terracing, crop rotation, contour plowing, and cover 
crops . . . .”26 Congress also established the precursor to the Farm Services 
Agency (FSA), a program intended to help tenant farmers purchase 
farmland.27 States also passed laws to incentivize land ownership including 
bans on long-term leases.28 These policies entrenched land ownership and 
conservation practices, which made incorporating sustainable methods a 
land tenure issue. 
While some policies were rooted in the past, “the times they are a-
changin’.”29 Tenancy re-emerged in the 1940s with corporations purchasing 
more land and renting it to farmers.30 Today, “[a]pproximately 39 percent 
of the 911 million acres of farmland in the contiguous 48 States is rented.”31 
In the next twenty years, two dominant trends will bring even more land 
into tenancy. 
First, a generational shift will drive more acres to tenancy. According 
to the USDA Survey on Land Ownership and Transfer (the USDA Survey), 
landowners “55 and older account for nearly 80 percent of all owner-
                                                                                                                 
 23. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Timeline: The Dust Bowl, supra note 21. 
 26. Id. 
 27.  KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5. 
 28. Id.  
 29. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ 
(Columbia Records 1964), https://bobdylan.com/songs/times-they-are-changin/. 
 30. See, e.g., Christopher P. Rodgers, Rural Development Policy and Environmental 
Protection: Reorienting English Law for A Multifunctional Agriculture, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 259, 285 
(2009) (“The rules of [the Agriculture Act of 1947] therefore reflect the agricultural imperative, and 
stress the need to maintain optimum levels of efficient production on tenanted holdings.”). 
 31. DANIEL BIGELOW ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, TENURE, AND 
TRANSFER, at iii (2016), [hereinafter USDA REPORT], https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/7 
4672/60298_eib161.pdf?v=42607.  
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operated land; almost 70 percent of all farmland owned by non-operating 
landlords is owned by people who are 65 and older.”32 Furthermore, “[t]en 
percent of all land in farms is expected to be transferred during 2015–19,” 
and for the first time ever, farmers will be transferring land to non-
farmers.33 “Landowners anticipate selling 3.8 [percent] of all farmland, with 
2.3 percent to be sold to non-relatives,” and “[6.5 percent] is expected to be 
transferred through trusts, gifts, and wills.”34 
Second, despite the percentage of land held in tenancy remaining 
relatively stable over time at between 30–40% of acres in production,35 the 
composition of landlords renting land to farmers will continue to change. 
Among the acres available for rent, 87% of the land is rented by “non-
operator landlords” without farming experience (individuals, corporations, 
partnerships, and trusts), while only 13% of the land is rented by “owner-
operator landlords” who already operate farms.36 
Given these two up-and-coming trends in land tenure, surprisingly little 
academic attention has been given to asking how sustainable practices will 
be preserved into the next century. This Article uniquely combines 
economic theory with farmland-practices survey data to highlight tangible 
and successful legal mechanisms to incentivize farmers, consumers, and 
regulators to facilitate sustainable agricultural policies.37 The Article 
proceeds as follows. Part II defines the economics of farming. Part III 
describes sustainable practices and the way in which land tenure impacts 
practice adoption. Part IV focuses on solutions found in the public and 
private sectors. In an era of limited federal regulatory power,38 a range of 
private solutions are presented, which include: altering the lease contract 
and expanding private conservation initiatives, certification systems, and 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Visualizing U.S. Farmland Ownership, Tenure, and Transition, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Mar. 2, 
2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/data-visualizations/other-visualizations/visualizing-us-
farmland-ownership-tenure-and-transition/. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 35. USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 5. 
 36. Id. at 17, 31 n.9. 
 37. See id. at i, v (analyzing the results of the 2014 Tenure, Ownership, and Transition of 
Agricultural Land (TOTAL) survey, which was administered by USDA’s ERS and National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) as part of a special follow-up to the 2012 Census of Agriculture 
to collect data from the owners and operators of agricultural land). 
 38. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339, 9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (aiming to reduce 
regulation and control regulatory costs by requiring each agency to begin taking steps to cut back on 
regulations); see also Andrew Soergel, Trump Executive Order Embraces “One-In, Two-Out” 
Regulatory Scheme, U.S. NEWS WORLD REP. (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017-01-30/trump-executive-order-embraces-one-in-two-out-
regulatory-scheme (describing the “one-in, two-out” policy, where “any additional regulation under 
consideration by the government can only be approved if two existing regulations are stripped away”). 
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ecosystem markets. Part V concludes, reiterating a need for incentives in 
conservation-farming practices. 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF FARMING 
Despite our nation’s strong agrarian roots, only 2% of the U.S. 
population produces food.39 Farming has become a consolidated enterprise; 
farms are much larger today with fewer individuals operating them. A few 
statistics highlight these trends. In 1900, about 40% of the total population 
lived on a farm compared to today, where the figures show only about 2% 
remain on farms.40 Today there are approximately two million farms 
(compared to the six and seven million farms in 1935), among which 
60,000 farms account for approximately 72% of the value of agricultural 
output value.41 
While farming operations have changed significantly over this century, 
some things remain the same. Farmers continue to be economic actors who 
respond to economic forces and always operate under uncertainty. 
Vulnerable to weather, disease, and pests, farmers consistently face “price 
or market risk (e.g., fluctuations in input costs and output prices), financial 
risk (e.g., shifts in interest rates and credit access), institutional risk 
(involving government policies), and human risk (including farmer health 
and labor issues).”42 Farmers adopt sustainable practices when those 
practices maximize the farm operation’s economic viability while 
minimizing its legal liability.43 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Fast Facts About Agriculture, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N., 
https://www.fb.org/newsroom/fast-facts (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
 40. See William Petit, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is It Setting the Stage for 
Significant Change in U.S. Agricultural Subsidy Use?, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 127, 134 n.79 (2004) (“In 
the 1930’s, 25 percent of the population lived on the nation’s 6 million farms; today, our 2 million farms 
are home to 2 percent of the population.”); Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007, 
38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 345, 359 (2006) (describing the changing demographics in American agriculture 
over time). 
 41. Petit, supra note 40, at 134. 
 42. See David B. Oppedahl, Taming Agricultural Risks, FED. RES. BANK CHI. (Jan. 2014), 
https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedhle/y2009ijann258a.html (identifying risks associated with agricultural 
production, including but not limited to market risk, institutional risk, and human risk). 
 43. Andres Trujillo-Barrera et al., Understanding Producers’ Motives to Adopt Sustainable 
Practices:  The Role of Expected Rewards, Risk Perception, and Risk Tolerance, 43 EUR. REV. AGRIC. 
ECON. 359, 363 (2016).  
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A. Economic Viability 
In some corporate models, firms are measured by a “triple bottom line” 
(economic profit, environmental sustainability, and social responsibility),44 
but few farmers are ever measured along these dimensions. From a business 
standpoint, farmers focus on preserving their operation, which means 
reducing costs and raising the quality and yield of their output.45 They 
maximize profits for the crops they decide to grow and the desired level of 
inputs (known as “factors of production,” or land, capital, labor, water, 
pesticides, and fuel, among others).46 These basic components of a farmer’s 
agricultural-production-function also consider seasonality, geography, and 
sources of technical change, risk, and uncertainty. For instance, “[n]ew 
businesses are springing up that promise to tell farmers how and when to 
till, sow, spray, fertilize or pick crops based on algorithms [and often 
drones] using data from their own fields.”47 New technologies are being 
developed that aim to improve yields and sustainability through improving 
soil health using fewer chemicals.48 While online marketing startups such as 
Farmingo, Full Circle, Barn2Door, and Good Eggs give farmers an online 
marketplace to sell their goods, many say that the e-commerce farm-to-
consumer market is saturated and not worth the cost.49 Ultimately, with or 
without technological sophistication, the calculus is the same: for an 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Triple Bottom Line, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/143016 
63. 
 45. See generally Loren W. Tauer, Do New York Dairy Farmers Maximize Profits or Minimize 
Costs?, 77 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 421, 421 (1995) (stating that most economists conclude that farms, as 
rational businesses, seek to minimize costs and maximize outputs to sell). 
 46. JOHN M. ANTLE, PESTICIDE POLICY, PRODUCTION RISK, AND PRODUCER WELFARE: AN 
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS 36–37 (1988). 
 47. Ludwig Burger, Digital Farming Could Spell Shake-up for Crop Chemicals Sector, 
REUTERS (May 2, 2016), http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-farming-digital-idUKKCN0XV0KP.  
 48. See Louisa Burnwood-Taylor, Microbe-Based Food and Agriculture Products Company 
BiOWiSH Raises $5m Series B, AGFUNDER NEWS (May 4, 2016), https://agfundernews.com/microbe-
based-food-ag-products-company-biowish-raises-5m-series-b5796.html?utm_source=AgFunder+Update 
s&utm_campaign=fc97554162-AgFunder_Weekly_Newsletter_May05&utm_medium=email&utm_ter 
m=0_7b0bb00edf-fc97554162-97956713 (describing BioWish’s microbial soil treatments that reduce 
the amount of fertilizer needed); see also Sara Sjolin, Monsanto Aims to Tackle Looming Global Food 
Crisis, MARKETWATCH (May 23, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/monsanto-aims-to-tackle-
looming-global-food-crisis-2016-04-06 (“[In] the world’s biggest field-test program of seeds laced with 
microbes, [Monsanto found] that corn yields increased by four bushels per acre, or about 2.2%. Yields 
on soybeans increased by 1.5 bushels per acre.”). 
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operation to be economically viable, it cannot spend more revenue than it 
makes. 
Land is the leading input and the leading expense in a farmer’s 
operation. Current land prices make land scarce. Land represents 80% of 
the cost of running a farm; a defining characteristic of current agriculture is 
a “fierce competition for land.”50 Land does not turn over very frequently, 
and because it takes more land to make a profit today, farmers are 
consistently under pressure to find more farmland (through renting or 
buying) to remain in business.51 
According to National Agricultural Statistics, land prices are currently 
at an all-time high—more for cropland, and less for pastureland.52 Factors 
that affect farmland values are: expected net returns, interest rates, 
government programs, capital investment in structures, non-farm demand, 
inflation, lending policies, other investments, speculation, trade, 
technology, site characteristics, and environmental issues.53 Land prices 
also vary by geography. “In some areas of the Northeast, farmland values 
are ten times the national average.”54 
The urbanization of agricultural lands, or farmland conversion, also 
raises land costs. “[U]rban and suburban sprawl” has transferred “over 30 
million acres” to development since 1970,55 raising land prices and making 
it nearly impossible for potential farmers to enter into this business.56 In 
addition, while land is the principal cost to the farming operation, other 
costs have risen recently. The largest cost increases are for fertilizer and 
seed, with projections of $569 per acre for corn and $324 per acre for 
soybeans.57 
New farmers are at a clear disadvantage. First, as the demand for land 
drives up the land price, beginning farmers trying to access farmland must 
contend with very high land costs.58 Next, not only are rental rates 
                                                                                                                 
 50. EDWARD COX, THE LANDOWNER’S GUIDE TO SUSTAINABLE FARM LEASING 20, 20 (2010), 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/leopold_pubspapers/70. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, 
U.S. DATA tbl.1, 8 (2009), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/usv1.pdf 
(showing the progression of the increasing market value of cropland between 1978 and 2007). 
 53. See David Oppendahl, Address at the U.S. Dep’t Agric. Agric. Outlook Forum (Feb. 24, 
2011) (PowerPoint available in U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Outlook Forum archives, 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/106149) (listing factors that affect farmland value).  
 54. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 6. 
 55. SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 39. 
 56. Id. 
 57. David B. Oppedahl, Agricultural Markets and Food Price Inflation–A Conference 
Summary, FED. RES. BANK CHI. (Jan. 2009), https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedhle/y2009ijann258a.html. 
 58. Id. 
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prohibitively high, but evidence that farmers are renewing their leases also 
limits their chances for acquiring land.59 Finally, even if a beginning farmer 
is able to get land, he/she will need to rent land from multiple landlords to 
achieve the number of acres required to make the farming operation 
economically viable. 
B. Legal Liability 
While farmers have flexibility regarding the inputs they select and the 
crops that they grow, farmers need to comply with regulatory requirements 
related to food safety and environmental protection, as well as tax and tort 
obligations.  
Food safety considerations have the highest potential to interfere with a 
farmer’s decision to adopt sustainable practices.60 Farmers need to ensure 
that sustainable practices do not come at a cost of compromising food 
safety standards set in the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 
(FSMA).61 Foodborne illnesses are a serious concern in the United States 
because they are responsible for ailing 47.8 million and hospitalizing 
127,839 Americans each year.62 Recent high-profile foodborne illness 
outbreaks have resulted in civil and criminal liability for farmers63 while 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See USDA REPORT, supra note 31 (noting that there is not a lot of new land coming to 
market).  
Ten percent (93 million acres) of all land in farms is expected to be transferred 
during 2015–2019, most of which (6 percent) will change hands through gifts, 
trusts, or wills. Of all land expected to be transferred, only about a quarter (21 
million acres) will be sold between nonrelatives. Another 14 percent (or 13 
million acres) is anticipated to be sold from one relative to another. While the 
amount of farmland expected to be sold is relatively small, some of the land 
transferred through trusts, wills, and gifts may then be sold by the new owners, 
bolstering the supply of land available for purchase.  
Id.(emphasis omitted); see also COX, supra note 50, at 21 (discussing short-term and long-term leases). 
 60. See, e.g., Margot J. Pollans, Regulating Farming: Balancing Food Safety and 
Environmental Protection in a Cooperative Governance Regime, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 399, 400–
02 (2015) (describing the trade-offs between food safety and environmental regulations and detailing the 
difficulty of asking farmers to bear additional regulatory costs). 
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 350(h)(3)(E) (2012) (as added by Food Safety and Modernization Act of 2011, 
Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3899). 
 62. Burden of Foodborne Illness: Findings, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-foodborne-estimates.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
 63. United States v. Quality Egg, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 940 n.18 (N.D. Iowa 2015) 
(detailing how the prosecution cited several recent cases where defendants were sentenced to prison or 
confinement after being convicted under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, including the Jensen Farms 
defendants); United States v. Parnell, No. 1:13-cr-12, 2013 WL 2387714, at *1 (M.D. Ga. May 30, 
2013) (stating that Parnell faced a 76-count indictment for introducing adulterated food into interstate 
commerce); Helena Bottemiller Evich, Prosecutions Scare Food Industry, POLITICO (Oct. 9, 2013, 5:05 
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/prosecutions-scare-food-industry-098011 (discussing 
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historic outbreaks have illustrated the devastating effects an outbreak can 
have in terms of market loss and litigation.64 
 Federal and state regulations, private litigation and supply chain 
obligations (such as providing third-party food-safety certifications) 
pressure farmers to adhere to the highest food-safety practices65––often at 
the cost of sustainable practices. When farmers are not contractually 
obligated to supply sustainably grown food, they are, at a minimum, 
obligated to produce food that is contractually safe for consumption. The 
result is that most farmers will prioritize food-safety standards over 
sustainable practice adoption.  
 For example, from a farm-level perspective, while growers want to 
protect soil and water quality while supporting wildlife habitats on the farm, 
they need to ensure that crops are free from contamination by fecal matter 
(which may introduce pathogens that can cause foodborne illnesses) in 
order to comply with private sector audit programs that contractually 
require them to meet certain food-safety and management practices.66 In the 
wake of a 2007 E. coli outbreak linked to spinach contaminated by fecal 
matter from roaming feral pigs, California leafy greens growers entered into 
a voluntary agreement—the Leafy Greens Marketing Act (LGMA)––to 
raise food-safety standards and preempt federal regulation.67 According to 
most accounts, resistance from small farms and sustainable agriculture 
nearly killed the agreement, but the agreement passed, while establishing 
standards “for evaluating safety of production in fields in California and 
                                                                                                                 
recent criminal prosecutions following food contamination); Lawsuit Blames Death on Dole Plant 
Salad, Listeria Outbreak, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 2, 2016), 
https://apnews.com/6a854a6b82fd4bbabe224c7c86ab5d95 (discussing civil lawsuits filed against Dole 
in connection to a listeria outbreak). 
 64. See Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: How Legal Liability Informs Food Safety 
Regulation, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 723, 728 (2013) (noting that an outbreak of microbial foodborne 
illness can have several adverse consequences). For example, Odwalla’s 1996 fruit juice recall resulted 
in “a voluntary product recall (valued at $12.5 million), a 17% drop in revenue during the first six 
months after the [recall], a record $1.5 million federal fine for interstate shipment of an adulterated food 
product . . . , and twenty-one personal injury lawsuits.” Id. 
 65. See Food Demand Survey, supra note 1, at 2 (demonstrating how consumers pressure 
farmers through consumer interest in issues such as Salmonella and E. coli, which become more 
prevalent when there are foodborne illness outbreaks); Jayson L. Lusk & Susan Murray, New Tool 
(FooDS) Identifies Consumers’ Views on Food Safety, 29 CHOICES 1, 5 (2014) (referencing consumers’ 
interest in GMOs, Salmonella, and E.coli makes farmers feel an increased pressure to adhere to 
consumer expectations in the food-safety arena). 
 66. K. LOWELL ET AL., PRODUCE SAFETY PROJECT, SAFE AND SUSTAINABLE: CO-MANAGING 
FOR FOOD SAFETY AND ECOLOGICAL HEALTH IN CALIFORNIA’S CENTRAL COAST REGION 61, 80 
(2010). 
 67. Marks, supra note 64, at 729, 780. 
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Arizona . . . .”68 “[G]rowers report[ed] yielding to tremendous pressure 
from auditors, inspectors, and other food safety professionals to change on-
farm management practices in ways that not only generate[d] uncertain 
food safety benefits, but also create[d] serious environmental 
consequences.”69 
While this account illustrates an example of farmers prioritizing food-
safety risks over sustainable practice adoption, this does not imply that 
farmers will always arrive at this solution. A supply chain obligation to 
supply sustainable foods or to maintain sustainable practices may prioritize 
sustainable practice adoption to the level of food safety. Similarly, 
environmental protection regulations have the potential to raise sustainable 
practice adoption to the level of food safety. For example, some federal 
programs require compliance with sustainable practices, such as the over 
23.8 million acres enrolled in the USDA Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP).70 A contractual obligation to maintain acreage in this program will 
sway growers to adopt sustainable practices while maintaining a required 
FSMA baseline of food-safety practices.   
III. SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 
Consumers often criticize conventional farmers for not farming 
sustainably, not holding a long-term perspective, and generally not farming 
in a way that ensures that croplands can be farmed and crops can be 
produced in perpetuity without diminishing yield, quality of crop, or health 
and resources of the soils.71 
A. Examples of Sustainable Practices 
Farmers who want to adopt sustainable practices often refer to the 1990 
Farm Bill definition,72 where sustainable practices imply examining the 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See Michaela Tarr Oldfield, Enactment of the Food Safety Modernization Act: The US FDA 
Within the Context of Interacting Public-Private Governance Processes, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG. 488, 493 
(2015) (describing the controversy behind the LGMA’s adoption). 
 69. LOWELL, supra note 66, at 5. 
 70. CRP Enrollment, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/Conservation/PDF/CRPEnrollmentMar2 
016DotDensity.pdf. 
 71. See, e.g., George Wuerthner, How ‘Cheap Food’ Industrial Agriculture Is Destroying 
America, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.organicconsumers.org/news/how-
cheap-food-industrial-agriculture-destroying-america (criticizing the agricultural industry for its 
environmental impacts). 
 72. See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. § 3103 (2012). 
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entire farm operation—all of the inputs and outputs to the farm endeavor—
for practices that are environmentally friendly, socially responsible, and 
economically viable across time considering the needs of future 
generations.73 Still, many wonder whether environmentally friendly, 
socially responsible, and economically viable food is possible from a day-
to-day management perspective.74 
On the farm, conservation practices take several forms, 75 and can be 
divided into two main categories: operational and permanent (with some 
overlap in the categories).76 “Most conservation practices are intended to 
decrease soil erosion” and preserve topsoil because “[t]opsoil is the most 
fertile part of the land holding the most nutrients for growing crops, and it 
takes up to a thousand years to develop one inch of new topsoil.”77 Farmers 
want to prevent soil from washing into nearby creeks and streams 
(disrupting the quality and flow of water), and from blowing away in an 
area that is overgrazed or not secured by plants. 
                                                                                                                 
“[S]ustainable agriculture” means an integrated system of plant and animal 
production practices having site-specific application that will, over the long-
term—(A) satisfy human food and fiber needs; (B) enhance environmental quality 
and the natural resource base upon which the agriculture economy depends; 
(C) make the most efficient use of nonrenewable resources and on-farm resources 
and integrate, where appropriate, natural biological cycles and controls; 
(D) sustain the economic viability of farm operations; and (E) enhance the quality 
of life for farmers and society as a whole. 
Id. 
 73. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that stewardship of both natural and human 
resources includes: “working and living conditions of laborers, the needs of rural communities, and 
consumer health and safety both in the present and the future”). The farm produces private and public 
goods like food, rural amenities (hunting, tourism, landscape enjoyment), environmental and cultural 
services, habitat for wild animals and plants, and biodiversity. Id. Sustainability also means finding 
sources of income outside of growing crops, but farmers must consider zoning. Id.; see also Cent. Or. 
Landwatch v. Deschutes County, 367 P.3d 560, 567 (Or. Ct. App. 2016) (ruling against a zoning change 
because petitioners did not intend to establish a private park as a park, but instead wanted to establish a 
private park solely for use as “a commercial event venue”). 




(noting from a management perspective that “it is reasonable to expect the current focus on 
sustainability will last for the foreseeable future”). 
 75. See Patricia E. Norris & Sandra S. Batie, Virginia Farmers’ Soil Conservation Decisions: 
An Application of Tobit Analysis, 19 S.J. AGRIC. ECON. 79, 80 n.2 (1987) (defining “[c]onservation 
practices” to include the use of “terraces, sod waterways, stripcropping, critical area planting, pasture or 
hayland establishment and/or management, cover crops, and tree planting”).  
 76. Michael D. Duffy, Conservation Practices for Landlords, AG DECISION MAKER (Iowa St. 
U.), Apr. 2014, at 4, http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1425&context=agdm. 
 77. Id. 
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An operational conservation practice can be implemented on a year-by-
year basis and can be used one year and not the next (e.g., contour buffer 
strips, contour farming, cover crops, crop rotation, managed grazing (such 
as rotational grazing), nutrient management, integrated pest management 
and residue management, like mulch and no-till).78 Meanwhile, a permanent 
conservation practice will remain in place until it is removed or altered 
(e.g., diversion, field borders, grade stabilization structure, grassed 
waterways, riparian buffer strips, stream bank and shoreline stabilization, 
terraces, water and sediment control basin, and windbreaks). 79 
Since farming is ultimately a business, the extent to which farmers 
adopt conservation measures depends largely upon the profitability of these 
practices80 rather than social or personal rewards.81 In an effort to maximize 
their economic viability while minimizing their legal liability, farmers 
considering sustainable practices calculate in terms of a farmer’s capital 
expenditures, operation and maintenance expenditures, as well as 
opportunity costs like foregone income from crops.82 If a conservation 
practice increases profitability––such as increasing yield or decreasing 
production costs––while not increasing risk (liability risk, regulatory 
compliance risk, market risk, etc.), it has adoption potential.83 Another 
consideration is that “[f]or some practices, a considerable portion of the 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See id. (referring to landlords’ ability to establish conservation practices). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Daniel Clay et al., Sustainable Intensification in the Highland Tropics: Rwandan Farmers’ 
Investments in Land Conservation and Soil Fertility, 46 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 351, 354 
(1998); see also Norris & Batie, supra note 75, at 79 (describing previous studies where factors 
influencing the voluntary enrollment in conservation practices included financial assistance, risk, 
attitudes, and income, among others); Linda Lee, The Impact of Landownership Factors on Soil 
Conservation, 62 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1070, 1071 (1980) (discussing the balance of income and 
conservation practices); Sean P. Neill & David R. Lee, Explaining the Adoption and Disadoption of 
Sustainable Agriculture: The Case of Cover Crops in Northern Honduras 4, 12 (Cornell U., Dep’t 
Agric., Working Paper No. 99-31, 1999) (explaining that a Honduran farmer’s abandonment of maize in 
favor of cattle was possibly due to the profitability of the practice). For examples of studies refuting this 
theory, see B. Smit & J. Smithers, Adoption of Soil Conservation Practices: An Empirical Analysis in 
Ontario, Canada, 3 LAND DEGRADATION & REHABILITATION 1, 9 (1992) (discussing that farmers are 
more willing to adopt “agricultural innovations” if there are “higher economic returns” for the farmer); 
Keith O. Fuglie, Conservation Tillage and Pesticide Use in the Cornbelt, 31 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED 
ECON. 1, 145 (1999) (describing why farmers adopt conservation tillage systems). For a study that finds 
no significant relationship, see Peter J. Nowak, The Adoption of Agricultural Conservation 
Technologies: Economic and Diffusion Explanations, RURAL SOC., Summer 1987, at 208, 211, 214–15 
(introducing the theory that conservation measures do not result in higher returns).   
 81. Trujillo-Barrera et al., supra note 43, at 376. 
 82. See generally PA. ST. U., COVER CROPS FOR CONSERVATION TILLAGE SYSTEMS 2 (2006), 
https://extension.psu.edu/cover-crops-for-conservation-tillage-systems (identifying the costs—e.g., 
additional operating costs or lost profits from competing crops—that farmers should consider when 
determining the profitability of cover crops as a sustainable practice). 
 83. Trujillo-Barrera et al., supra note 43, at 363. 
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fixed costs can be paid with cost share funds,” with the amount of funds 
depending upon the practice and varying by county. 84 
B. Sustainable Practices and Land Tenure Status 
How do landowners and renters differ in their decision to adopt 
sustainable practices? In other words, in what way does land tenure affect a 
farmer’s daily decisions on input use, seasonal planting decisions, annual 
farmland rental decisions, and multi-year decisions about ownership and 
maintenance of land, machinery, and facilities? 
In the United States, land ownership is the dominant land tenure status 
followed by tenancy. The USDA Survey provides valuable trends on land 
tenure status to better examine the constraints under which land owners and 
tenants operate.85 According to the USDA Survey, over 60% of agricultural 
land is operated by owners of that land, with the remaining 39% of land 
operated by renters.86 There are two types of landowners. “Operator 
landlords” are landowner farmers and own 20% of rented land (70 million 
acres).87 “Non-operator landlords” own 80% of rented acres88 but are not 
actively involved in farming themselves, and have little to no farming 
experience.89 These absentee landowners consist of older, retired, often 
female individuals or inheritors who live increasingly farther away from the 
land they rent.90 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See Duffy, supra note 76, at 5. 
 85. USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 5, 6.  
 86. Id. at iii, 5.  On farms with annual sales of over $25,000, 60% of farm operators lease some 
or all of their land. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 6. If gross sales exceed $25,000, 78% of 
farm operators are full owners; 16% are part owners; and 7% are tenants. Id. If gross sales are between 
$25,000 and $500,000, 40% of farm operators are full owners; 49% are part-owners; and 11% tenants. 
Id. If sales exceed $500,000, 40% of farm operators are full owners; 50% are part owners; and 10% are 
tenants. Id. 
 87. USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at iii, 17.    
 88. Id. at iv, 17. 
Non-operator landlords are more likely than operator landowners to acquire land 
through inheritance. Operator landowners acquired over 50 percent of their 
owned land through a purchase from a nonrelative, while non-operating landlords 
acquired over 50 percent through an inheritance or gift. Of the 45 percent of non-
operator landlords who have no prior experience with farming, more than two-
thirds either inherited or received their land as a gift. Thus, although a 
considerable fraction of non-operator landlords have not farmed, some familial or 
personal relationship to farming may exist. 
Id. at iv (emphasis omitted). 
 89. Id. at iii.  
 90. See id. at 17, 38 (explaining that female landlords and retired farmers, for example, make 
up 38% of non-operator landlords). 
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While some believe that farmers who rent are less likely to adopt 
sustainable practices compared to those who own the land—either because 
they lack historical or emotional ties to the land, or are less sensitive to the 
history, “the sense of accomplishment, the sacrifice, and the pride 
embodied in the land”91—the adoption of sustainable practices comes down 
to finances. Tenants and owners have conflicting incentives regarding 
conservation and production practices due to their financial interests in 
short-term or long-term economic returns from the agricultural land. Tenant 
farmers are less likely to have an incentive to adopt practices that improve 
the long-term sustainability of the operation because tenants are short-term 
contractors who operate under a shorter time horizon (the lease).92 
Lease duration influences tenant decision-making in several ways. 
First, because leases are yearly,93 this affects the time horizon under which 
farmers calculate investments. Normally, a rational individual calculates the 
income effects of a proposed conservation program over time and compares 
these effects to his/her expected income over the same time without 
conservation measures. For example, farmers sharing similar erosion 
problems may reach different conservation investment decisions depending 
on individual time preference or discount rates and the length of their 
planning horizon. “A lower discount rate and a longer planning horizon are 
thought to encourage conservation decisions by increasing the present value 
of expected net revenues and by allowing sufficient time to recoup 
conservation investments.”94 
Econometric studies confirm these anecdotal findings. Many studies 
highlight financial constraints to conservation adoption. First, landowners 
who typically have higher income rarely face these constraints. For 
instance, one study of owner-operators found that higher farm income 
levels are associated with lower rates of erosion resulting from a 
combination of less erosive land and more conservation practices.95 
                                                                                                                 
 91. LeeAnn E. Moss & Bernie Erven, Extension Factsheet on Managing Landlord-Tenant 
Relationships: A Strategic Perspective, OHIO ST. U. EXTENSION (Apr. 1, 2001), https://conservationc 
onnect.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/tenant-landowner-relationship.pdf. 
 92. See COX, supra note 50, at 20–21 (finding that sustainable practices result in extra costs for 
tenants). 
 93. See USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 26 tbl.3 (stating that 70% of farm leases are a yearly 
lease). 
 94. Lee, supra note 80, at 1070 (noting the effect of discount rates and planning horizons on 
the likelihood of adopting conservation decisions). 
 95. Id. at 1074. 
Nationally, only 40% of cultivated cropland owned by the most affluent 
landowners is classified as having an erosion hazard, while 59% of cultivated 
cropland owned by the lowest income group is labeled erosion prone. . . . In terms 
of management, 60% of cultivated cropland owned by landowners with net farm 
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Farmers who spend more on conservation measures typically also perceive 
soil erosion on their land, have larger farms, lower debt levels, higher 
income, and a conservation plan in place.96 Second, tenants have lower 
income and spend less on conservation practices. One study showed that 
farmers who spend less on conservation measures are farmers who rent 
land, work off-farm, and have higher debt levels.97 These studies show that 
programs designed to encourage the voluntary adoption of conservation 
practices should consider the special needs of limited-resource farmers. 
Lease type has been identified as an institutional barrier to sustainable 
practice adoption.98 Short-term leases and fixed-cash leases both reduce a 
farmer’s incentive to maintain the productivity of rented land and the 
likelihood of investing in conservation practices.99 Lease terms that define a 
cost-sharing arrangement between the tenant and the landlord may prevent 
practice adoption when the tenant bears most of the cost for a long-term 
benefit to the landlord.100 When land is rented, the landlord and tenant often 
share costs. Depending on whether the land improvement costs are long-
term or short-term, the landowner or the tenant may pay for them.101 “Often 
the conservation practices benefit the landlord, but in certain cases the 
tenant also will benefit due to factors such as improved yields, easier 
farming conditions and less potential for water damage.”102 Soil nutrients, 
for example, are one cost shared by the parties because they have both a 
short-term and long-term effect.103 Costs can be split in half, or the landlord 
pays for activities that have continuing benefits on the soil while the tenant 
                                                                                                                 
income greater than $50,000 had minimum tillage or residue practices in effect, 
while 47% of such land owned by those with net farm incomes of less than 
$3,000 had these practices at the national level.  
Id.; see also The Great Depression, the Family Farm and the New Deal, PBS, 
https://vermont.pbslearningmedia.org/resource/5e632ed9-8d7c-464a-bd4c-05a62208205e/the-great-depr 
ession-the-family-farm-and-the-new-deal/#.Wnp5DKinE2w (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (describing FSA 
aid under the New Deal). 
 96. Norris & Batie, supra note 75, at 84. 
 97. Id. at 84, 87. 
 98. See Lee, supra note 80, at 1071 (listing lease arrangements in addition to absentee 
ownership, small operating units, high property taxes, and lack of credit facilities). 
 99. Id. at 1075; see also Meredith J. Soule et al., Land Tenure and the Adoption of 
Conservation Practices, 82 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 993, 995–96 (2000) (noting that fixed-cash agreements 
are less likely to be associated with conservation practices that provide benefits over the long-term).  
 100. See Rusty Rumley, Agricultural Contracts and the Leasing of Land, NAT’L AGRIC. L. 
CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/articles/rumley_contractsandleases-
ppt.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (describing crop-share leases and allocation of short-term and long-
term costs). 
 101. Improving Your Farm Lease Contract, IOWA ST. U. EXTENSION & OUTREACH (Iowa St. U. 
Extension) May 2017, at 5, https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/wholefarm/html/c2-01.html.  
 102. Duffy, supra note 76, at 5. 
 103. Rumley, supra note 100.  
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is responsible for chemicals that have an immediate effect, such as nitrogen 
(and also insect and weed control).104 Costs for cleaning waterways and 
increased nutrient contamination are directly associated with soil erosion, 
but neither the tenant nor the landlord bear these costs.105 
Other factors also affect conservation practice adoption. Even if tenants 
wanted to adopt sustainable practices, they often lack decision-making 
authority for long-term investments. The USDA Survey shows that 
“[l]andlord input to farm management decisions on rented land varies by 
type of decision” and by type of landlord.106 Tenants make decisions on 
short-term farm management practices, such as cultivation practices, crop 
choice, and harvesting, with no input from landlords.107 Meanwhile, 
landlords are more likely to be involved in long-term decisions, such as 
adopting permanent conservation practices and participating in Government 
programs.108 Landlord input also varies by type of landlord: operator 
landlords provide more input in farm management decisions than their non-
operating counterparts, perhaps because they have more farming 
experience.109 
Given these different sets of constraints, some sustainable practices are 
more likely to be adopted by tenants for their ability to lower farming costs. 
Some improvements in agricultural technologies and production practices 
have substantially lowered the energy use, water use, and greenhouse-gas 
impacts of food production per unit of output over time.110 Many farmers, 
including tenants, use conservation tillage (using minimum tillage or no-till 
practices)111 for its potential for increased returns (a negative expenditure) 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id.; see also Rusty W. Rumley & Benjamin L. Thomas, Written Sugarcane Leases:  
Protecting the Interests of the Farmer and Landowner, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR. 1, 3, 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/articles/rrumley_leasesfactsheet.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2018) (describing the typical roles tenants and landlords assume in managing soil). 
 105. Duffy, supra note 76, at 5. 
 106. See USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at iv (describing the role of landlords in short-term and 
long-term decision-making).   
 107. Id. at 29. 
 108. Id. at 30–31. 
 109. See id. (contrasting non-operator and operator land-management decisions). 
 110. See J. L. Capper, The Environmental Impact of Beef Production in the United States: 1977 
compared with 2007, 89 J. ANIMAL SCI., 4249, 4256–57 (2011) (comparing the per unit inputs, outputs, 
and emissions of beef production in 1977 and 2007); Michael Cavigelli et al., US Agricultural Nitrous 
Oxide Emissions: Context, Status, and Trends, 10 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T, 537, 545 (2012) 
(describing how efficiency in crop and meat production has lowered nitrogen dioxide emissions). 
 111. See Norris & Batie, supra note 75, at 80 n.3. 
Minimum tillage is the minimum soil manipulation necessary for crop production 
or meeting tillage requirements under the existing soil and climate conditions. 
No-tillage is a method of planting crops that involves no seedbed preparation 
other than opening the soil for the purpose of placing the seed at the proper depth. 
Id. 
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over conventional tillage practices.112 Additionally, some farmers rely on 
seeds and crop rotation to help save costs; for instance, biotechnology has 
led farmers to use cover crops and practice more no-till farming.113 Nearly 
all corn, wheat, and soybean farmers avoid monocultures by practicing crop 
rotation.114 Studies confirm that conservation tillage is likely to be used by 
renters, but only under these conditions: (1) when practices do not require 
large investments of time and capital;115 (2) when they are production 
enhancing;116 (3) when renters are not bound by certain types of leases;117 
or (4) when landlords require them to invest in sustainable practices. 
Conservation tillage is less likely to be used as farm income, age, off-farm 
income, and soil erosion increase.118 This is supported by a more recent 
study that found that Iowa farmers who own their land are more likely to 
rotate crops, but less likely than full tenants and part-owners to use 
conservation tillage.119 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See Catherine L. Kling, Can Voluntary Adoption of Agricultural Practices Achieve 
Hypoxic Zone Reduction Goals, AGRIC. POL’Y REV., Spring 2014, at 5, 8, 
https:/lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=agpolicyreview (noting that, in 2008, 
farmers in 12 states were asked to voluntarily align their farming practices with the Hypoxia Task Force 
recommendations, which aimed to reduce the level of oxygen depletion in the Gulf of Mexico through 
“conservation tillage, reduced nitrogen application rates, increased use of side dressing, cover crops, 
wetlands, buffers, controlled drainage, and bioreactors”).  Of the methods recommended by the Hypoxia 
Task Force, “conservation tillage and alterations in nitrogen application rates and timing have the 
greatest potential to increase profitability at the farm level. . . . However these practices alone are likely 
to achieve only a modest (less than 9%) reduction in nutrients, far short of the 40% reduction goal for 
agriculture.” Id.  
 113. See Jorge Fernandez-Corneio et al., Pesticide Use in U.S. Agriculture: 21 Selected Crops, 
1960–2008, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. RES. SERV. ECON. INFO. BULL., No. 124, May 2014, at 6, 30, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/43854/46734_eib124.pdf (explaining the use of 
conservation practices relative to pesticide use); see also John Horowitz, et al., “No-Till” Farming Is a 
Growing Practice, USDA ECON. RES. SERV., ECON. INFO. BULL., No. 70, Nov. 2010, at 17 (reporting 
an increase in no-till operations in the U.S.); Edward D. Perry et al., Testing for Complementarity: 
Glyphosate Tolerant Soybeans and Conservation Tillage, 98 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 765, 767 (2016) 
(providing testing for conservation practices).     
 114. Soil Tillage and Crop Rotation, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Apr. 4, 2017), 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-management/crop-livestock-practices/soil-tillage-and-
crop-rotation/. 
 115. Sarah Varble et al., An Examination of Growing Trends in Land Tenure and Conservation 
Practice Adoption: Results from a Farmer Survey in Iowa, 57 ENVTL. MGMT. 318, 326 (2016) 
(explaining how conservation tillage is used by farmers to decrease their energy and labor costs). 
 116. See Lee, supra note 80, at 1071 (noting the tendency of certain leases to reduce landlord 
income).  
 117. See Soule et al., supra note 99, at 994–96 (explaining that conservation tillage is profitable 
in the short term and is used by renters with short-term leases that have few constraints). 
 118. Norris & Batie, supra note 75, at 85. 
 119. Varble, supra note 115, at 318. 
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IV. A PAGE FROM THE SUSTAINABLE FARMER’S PLAYBOOK 
Given the constraints under which tenants operate, there are many 
public and private sector mechanisms to incentivize farmers—tenants and 
landowners—to adopt sustainable practices on the land. Table 1 introduces 
the recommendations discussed in the following subsections. 
 
Table 1: Recommendations for Incentivizing Tenants to Adopt 
Sustainable Practices 
 
Public Sector Recommendations 
 
 Expand Access to Federal Conservation Programs 
 Expand Funding and Enforcement for Certifications that 
Incentivize Sustainability 
 Integrate Conservation Goals into Other Federal Programs 
 Expand State Legislation Favoring Conservation (e.g., 
Minnesota Agricultural Water Control Certification Program) 
 
Private Sector Recommendations 
 
 Reform Lease Contracts  
o Longer Leases 
o Add Environmental Stipulations or Sustainability 
Provisions 
 Industry Collaborations and Other Contracting Opportunities 
That Make Sense 
 Enhance Private Conservation Initiatives 
 
A. Public Sector Recommendations 
1. Expand Tenant Access to Federal Conservation Programs 
Conservation programs emerged during a time when land ownership 
was preferred over land tenancy, a sentiment that continues to this day. 
Federal programs encouraging farmers to adopt sustainable practices 
mobilized in the 1940s as a result of the Dust Bowl and high rates of 
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tenancy.120 At that time, “[c]hanging land tenure patterns were considered 
as important as soil conservation programs in stopping the serious rates of 
soil erosion.”121 Federal programs were developed “to help tenant farmers 
purchase a farm of their own” and “resettle farm families who had lost their 
farms through foreclosure. . . . [T]he federal Farm Security Administration, 
under the Tenant Purchase Program, put 12,000 landless families onto a 
farm of their own.”122 As a result, land ownership predominated, both 
numerically and in terms of acres farmed, well into the 1970s and 1980s.123 
The problem was that, over time, farmers gradually lost control over 
farm prices, and received a smaller share of consumer dollars spent on 
agricultural products. Indebted to banks and vulnerable to seasonal and 
other risks, economic pressures led to an enormous loss of small farms and 
farmers.124 From 1987 to 1997, more than 155,000 farms were reportedly 
lost leading to the collapse of rural communities.125 Federal government 
programs expanded once again following this crisis, supporting farmers 
with policies such as crop insurance, renewable fuel mandates, the 
conservation reserve program, and land conversion restrictions.126 
Given the uncertainty of agricultural production decisions, farmers 
have come to rely on the programs created during these eras—government 
farm policies (price support programs which stabilize revenue streams) and 
conservation regulations (which provide subsidies for sustainable 
practices)—to sustain their operations, especially in downward cycles.127 
Just as landowners have come to rely on these streams of income, they have 
also come to rely on a model of farming rooted in ownership. 
The problem today, given changes in land tenure and a renewed 
interest in sustainable practice adoption, is that most federal government 
programs target agricultural landowners directly, with few programs 
extending to tenants. For most federal conservation programs, the eligible 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5 (describing post-Dust Bowl tenancy 
policies). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. “Today’s Farm Services Agency, which provides agricultural credit and credit 
guarantees, is the modern-day offspring of the Resettlement Administration. The Resettlement 
Administration was renamed the Farm Security Administration in 1937, the Farmer’s Home 
Administration in 1946, and the Farm Services Agency in 1991.” Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. See id. (describing the burst of agriculture’s speculative bubble). 
 125. SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 39.  
 126. See Morrow, supra note 40, at 351 (discussing the 1996 FAIR Act, which expanded 
farmers’ rights). 
 127. See Christopher R. Kelly & John S. Harbison, A Guide to the ASCS Administrative Appeal 
Process and to the Judicial Review of ASCS Decisions, 36 S.D. L. REV. 14, 16 n.11 (1991) (“The large 
federal farm program expenditures in the late 1980s meant that many farmers depended heavily on farm 
program payments for their farm income.”). 
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party to receive a financial payment is an “agricultural producer [who has] 
legal control over the land for the entire contract period”128 of one to ten 
years, with one exception.129 Through the USDA, the federal government 
oversees several voluntary conservation incentive programs, the main 
programs being the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the 
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), and the parallel structure 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP).130 These programs 
primarily consist of cost-sharing arrangements for constructing or adopting 
new conservation practices, payments for practices that provide 
environmental benefits, and rent payments for retiring highly erodible 
land.131 
The CRP is designed to prevent the erosion of topsoil and reduce water 
runoff and sedimentation. Farmland owners who convert land used for 
agricultural production to resource-conserving vegetative covers (typically 
grasses or trees) receive rental payments for a 10- to 15-year term, or every 
year the land is enrolled in the CRP.132 Farmers enrolled in the CRP do not 
qualify for enrollment in the CSP, a voluntary incentive-based working 
lands program. The CSP is the largest conservation program in the United 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Ed Cox, Conservation Law, DRAKE U. AGRIC. CTR. (Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter 
Conservation Law], http://sustainablefarmlease.org/conservation-law/.  
Cost-share share funding is limited to 75 percent but is usually funded at 
approximately 50 percent. Cost-share limitations are higher for beginning, 
limited-resource, and socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers, who may 
receive up to 90 percent of the estimated cost for certain conservation practices. 
The maximum payment a participant can receive is $300,000 for all EQIP 
contracts entered during any six-year period. However, if the NRCS Chief 
determines a project to have special environmental significance this limitation 
may be waived to a maximum of $450,00 [sic]. Limits for assistance with organic 
production are established at $20,000 per year and $80,000 for any six-year 
period.  
Id. For more information, see Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. NAT. RES. 
CONSERVATION SERV. [hereinafter Environmental Quality Incentives Program], https://www.nrcs.usd 
a.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/eqip (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (discussing the 
eligibility requirements for EQIP).  
 129. The USDA Transition Incentives Program (TIP) offers retired or retiring owners two 
additional rental payments beyond the term of the contract by leasing expiring CRP land to a beginning 
or socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher. Transition Incentives Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation-programs/transition-incentives/index 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2018). 
 130. See CONG. RES. SERV., R40763, AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION: A GUIDE TO 
PROGRAMS 9, 12, 16 (2017) (highlighting a list of incentive programs; however, this list does not 
mention other programs that may help reduce soil erosion coupled with other conservation objectives, 
such as the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program and the Wetland Reserve Program).  
 131. Id. 
 132. Conservation Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-
and-services/conservation-programs/conservation-reserve-program/index (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
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States with 70 million acres of productive agricultural and forest land 
enrolled in the CSP.133 The program pays producers for installing and 
adopting new conservation practices and compensates producers for 
improving, maintaining, and managing existing activities.134 The EQIP 
provides financial incentives and technical assistance to help farmers and 
landowners establish conservation practices and structures, and mostly 
targets environmental concerns arising from livestock and poultry 
production.135 
2. Expand Funding and Enforcement for Certifications That Incentivize 
Sustainability 
Regulators can encourage sustainable practices by creating, funding, 
and enforcing certification programs. The USDA Organic certification is 
the best known sustainable certification.136 Developed in the 1990s and 
created by the Organic Foods Production Act and the National Organic 
Program, the USDA created standards for the production, handling, and 
labeling of organic agricultural products.137 
While sustainable agriculture is not organic agriculture by definition, 
most consider organic agriculture to be an environmentally sustainable 
system because organic agriculture requires less energy (e.g., pesticides).138 
Moreover, organic products support sustainability in that they emphasize 
the use of renewable sources, land management that maintains natural soil 
fertility, water conservation, biodiversity, and long-term sustainability.139 
Demand for these products is high: the market has almost quadrupled its 
market share in the last decade, with sales of organic food growing from 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Conservation Stewardship Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/po 
rtal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/csp/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2018). 
 134. CSP - Learn More, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detailfu 
ll/national/programs/financial/csp/?cid=nrcseprd1288524 (last visited Apr. 23, 2018). 
 135. Environmental Quality Incentives Program, supra note 128. 
 136. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., USDA Reports Record Growth in U.S. Organic 
Producers (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2016/04/04/usda-reports-record-
growth-us-organic-producers. 
 137. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501, 6503 (2012). 
 138. See Christopher T. Jones, The Manic Organic Panic: First Amendment Freedoms and 
Farming or the Attack of the Agriculture Appropriations Rider, 26 J. LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 423, 429 
(2006) (“Environmental effects of conventional farming are legion, and some consumers, loath to 
contribute to the possible environmental threats and harms, choose organic products as a result.”). 
 139. See Ann Plotto & Jan A. Narcisco, Guidelines and Acceptable Postharvest Practices for 
Organically Grown Produce, 41 HORTSCI. 237, 287 (2006) (citing 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2014)) (discussing 
soil benefits associated with organic farming). 
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$3.6 billion in 1997 to over $39 billion in 2014.140 For the farmer, organic 
products have economic benefits as they sell for more than their 
conventional counterparts.141 
Two criticisms of the USDA Organic program have emerged. First, not 
all farmers are able to access the program because the USDA has not kept 
up with the demand for this certification.142 Organic certification is 
available to tenants, but only when the landowner has taken on the 
responsibility of organic certification.143 However, leases can be written to 
incorporate cost-sharing for organic certification.144 Farmers need to be 
made aware of federal and state cost-sharing programs available for organic 
certification. For example, “[t]he National Organic Certification Cost Share 
Program (NOCCSP) is administered through the USDA and state agencies 
and makes up to 75 percent of the costs for certification reimbursable.”145 
Second, the infrequent nature of USDA Organic inspections has 
allowed some agricultural producers to shirk their grazing requirements.146 
The concern here is that, for growers who pay to certify USDA Organic, the 
program needs to be enforced to prevent dilution of the expensive organic 
certification. 
                                                                                                                 
 140. STATE OF THE INDUSTRY, ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N (2015), 
https://www.ota.com/sites/default/files/indexed_files/StateOfOrganicIndustry.pdf. 
 141. A. Bryan Endres & Lisa Schlessinger, Pollen Drift: Reframing the Biotechnology Liability 
Debate, 118 PA. ST. L. REV. 815, 817 n.8 (2014) (discussing how processors and consumers are willing 
to pay a premium for organic products). 
 142. See Stephanie Strom, Paying Farmers to Go Organic, Even Before the Crops Come In, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2016), [hereinafter Strom, Paying Farmers] 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/business/paying-farmers-to-go-organic-even-before-the-crops-co 
me-in.html (noting that excess demand for organic products is more than certified organic producers can 
grow, and that cost inhibitions make organic production financially impossible for some farmers). 
 143. See id. (describing the investment required by landowners in certifying their operation as 
organic, such as spending significantly more in production costs to meet organic standards while selling 
the crops at a conventional price until the 2- to 3-year certification period has ended).  
 144. See Ed Cox, Organic Certification on Leased Farmland, DRAKE U. AGRIC. L. CTR. (Mar. 
15, 2011) [hereinafter Organic Certification], http://sustainablefarmlease.org/2010/11/assisting-with-
organic-certification/ (providing information for landowners interested in assisting tenants with organic 
certification). 
 145. Id.; see also Organic Cost Share Programs, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/grants/occsp (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (highlighting the program’s 
benefits). 
 146. See Peter Whoriskey, Why Your “Organic” Milk May Not Be Organic, WASH. POST (May 
1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-your-organic-milk-may-not-be-
organic/2017/05/01/708ce5bc-ed76-11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.ca0fb472ff0b 
(reporting that large milk producers often scheduled annual inspections with third-party inspectors 
outside of the grazing season; meanwhile, reporters often observed very few cows ever grazing). 
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3. Integrate Conservation Goals into Other Federal Programs 
Other federal programs, such as the FSA Beginning Farmer programs, 
can follow the lead of federal price-support programs, which condition 
payments to tenants and landowners upon adherence to sustainable 
practices.147 Beginning farm-ownership loan programs, such as the FSA’s, 
can be tied to environmental stewardship by taking “the form of preferential 
loan terms, debt forgiveness, debt for nature swapping, and/or advantageous 
terms for capital associated with transition to organic or sustainable 
practices.”148 
The only problem with this is that these payments are subject to 
congressional approval.149 While these federal programs incentivize owners 
to adopt sustainable practices, members of Congress, as well as farm 
organizations, have called for an end to direct subsidies in the 2012 Farm 
Bill in favor of subsidized crop insurance, which does not have 
conservation compliance provisions attached.150 “Therefore, the future 
effectiveness of conservation compliance is uncertain.”151 
4. Expand State-level Regulations and Incentives for Sustainable 
Agriculture 
Governments do not grow food, farmers do; but, government programs 
support farmer decision-making. Various state-level initiatives incentivize 
renters of land to adopt sustainable practices. Going back in time, the high 
rate of tenancy and absentee landlords, which characterized the post-Dust 
Bowl era, prompted states to pass laws requiring conservation of the soil.152 
In 1937, the President’s Committee on Farm Tenure recommended that 
states consider legislation to improve the farm tenancy situation.153 States 
responded by passing laws favoring land ownership over leasing, including 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Aspects of Farm Tenancy in Iowa, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 267, 
311, 313 (1984) [hereinafter Legal Aspects] (discussing conditions for participating in federal price-
support programs). 
 148. PARSONS, ET AL., THE FARMLASTS PROJECT:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FARMLASTS PROJECT RESEARCH REPORT 1, 7 (2010), 
http://www.uvm.edu/farmlasts/projectexecutivesummary.pdf. 
 149. Funding, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/farm-loan-
programs/funding/index (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
 150. Kathleen Masterson, Farm Bill: Direct Payments to Farmers May Dry Up in 2012, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 4, 2011, 2:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2011/10/04/141047164/farm-
bill-direct-payments-to-farmers-may-dry-up-in-2012. 
 151. Conservation Law, supra note 128. 
 152. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5. 
 153. See Albert H. Cotton, Regulations of Farm Landlord-Tenant Relationships, 4 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 508, 508 (1937) (discussing the President’s Committee on Farm Tenure report). 
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a ban on long-term leases in some states.154 Today, many statutes are in 
place to preserve the soil, such as statutes on land tenancy, mandatory soil-
loss limits, crop-residue laws, duty of stewardship soil-conservation 
statutes, duty of good husbandry statutes, as well as voluntary initiatives, 
including the Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program 
(the Minnesota Program).155 Most initiatives support tenants as well as 
landlords in adopting sustainable land practices. 
Iowa statutes, as well as relevant case law on land tenancy and 
mandatory soil-loss limits, make Iowa a national model for giving basic 
rights to tenants and for recognizing the public right to require landowners 
to properly care for the soil. Many states adopted land-tenancy laws similar 
to those found in Iowa, with statutes addressing notice and termination 
procedures specifically for agricultural tenancies.156 In the 1970s, Iowa 
developed mandatory soil-loss limits and laws aimed at property owners to 
establish and maintain soil and water conservation practices, which were 
enforced by commissioners of soil and conservation districts.157 “[I]n order 
for a farm to remain eligible for USDA farm program payments,” the law 
requires each district to establish soil-loss limits on highly erodible land “to 
five tons per acre in a year,” which is “the maximum soil loss considered 
sustainable . . . .”158 The State of Iowa also allows tenants the right to 
remove crop residue and use it.159 
Implied covenants of good husbandry, typically based on common 
community practices, apply to agricultural leases in most states.160 While 
these practices are able to provide some protection against harmful 
                                                                                                                 
 154. KOHANOWICH ET AL., supra note 19, at 5. 
 155. See generally Huong N. Tran & Liu Chuang, State Conservation District Laws 
Developments and Variations (U.S. Dep’t Agric., Working Paper No. 3, 1996), 
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/de/home/?cid=nrcs143_014208#tables (detailing how 
the Federal Dust Bowl soil conservation response evolved through the states to incorporate water 
conservation); see also Neil D. Hamilton, Essay, Feeding Our Green Future: Legal Responsibilities and 
Sustainable Agriculture Land Tenure, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 377, 389–90 (2008) [hereinafter Hamilton 
Essay] (describing how Iowa’s duty of stewardship arises out of the state conservation district law). 
 156. See Legal Aspects, supra note 147, at 306 (collecting cases addressing tenancy laws); see 
also McElwee v. DeVault, 120 N.W.2d 451, 453–54 (Iowa 1963) (establishing that a party can violate a 
covenant of good husbandry by engaging in techniques that constitute poor cultivation practices and 
reduce yields, and possibly even practices that produce excessive soil loss).  
 157. See Hamilton Essay, supra note 155, at 389–90 (noting that § 161A of the Iowa Code 
enables the creation of Soil and Water Conservation Districts). 
 158. Conservation Law, supra note 128.  
 159. IOWA CODE § 562.5A (2018) (bestowing ownership of any above-ground portion of a plant 
to farm tenants, unless the parties agrees to a different arrangement in writing, including corn-stalks, 
stover, or any other residue from the plant); see also Slach v. Heick, 864 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2015) (unpublished table decision) (citing IOWA CODE § 562.5A, and noting that it gives tenants a “right 
to crop residue in the absence of a writing stating otherwise”).  
 160. COX, supra note 50, at 31. 
594 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 42:567 
exploitation of a farm’s resources, they “[do] not necessarily guarantee the 
adoption of sustainable practices . . . .”161 Iowa has not explicitly adopted an 
implied covenant of good husbandry; however, an implied covenant is said 
to exist because Iowa common law requires all tenants to use leased 
property in a “proper and tenant-like manner” and not to commit waste.162 
Also, the Iowa Supreme Court has established a duty of stewardship 
regarding the state’s soil resources.163 
The Minnesota Program is a voluntary opportunity for farmers 
(including tenants) and agricultural landowners designed to accelerate 
adoption of on-farm practices that protect Minnesota’s lakes and rivers.164 
Launched in 2012 with $9 million in financial assistance to growers from 
the USDA and the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Program operates 
under a memorandum of understanding.165 The program offers producers 
recognition, financial and technical assistance, and regulatory certainty,166 a 
branding and marketing opportunity, check-up, and validation.167 
Importantly, the Minnesota Program certifies land in tenancy. As per 
the agreement, land comprising the agricultural operation is land that may 
be possessed by ownership, written lease, or other legal agreement that the 
producer operates.168 And, “[u]pon leasing any additional agricultural land 
after the start date of this agreement, notify a certifying agent before 
performing any farming practices on the additional land.”169 Also, a 
producer need not make permanent alterations to the land.170 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id.. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. 
 164. See Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program, MINN. DEP’T AGRIC., 
http://www.mda.state.mn.us/awqcp (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (providing information about the 
Minnesota Program). 
 165. Janet Kubat Willette, Water Quality Certainty Program Receives $9 Million, AGRINEWS 
(Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.agrinews.com/news/minnesota_news/water-quality-certainty-program-
receives-million/article_87c5b066-da36-5c28-89a2-0842f07f1a80.html. 
 166. See MINN. DEP’T AGRIC., supra note 164 (noting that any agency rules dealing with water 
quality exempt those certified under the program). 
 167. BRAD REDLIN, MINN. DEP’T AGRIC., MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL WATER QUALITY 
CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, https://www.co.olmsted.mn.us/environmentalresources/commission/Docum
ents/MN%20Agricultural%20Water%20Quality%20Certification%20Program.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 
2018). 
 168. MINN. DEP’T AGRIC., MINN. AGRIC. WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION AGREEMENT, 
http://www.mda.state.mn.us/~/media/Files/protecting/waterprotection/mawqcp/mawqcpagreementx.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2018). 
 169. Id. 
 170. According to the agreement, maintaining certification does not require producers “to 
implement practices that permanently alter” the leased land’s landscape “if leased land is added after the 
start date of [the] agreement [and] [p]roducer[s] . . . demonstrate, to the satisfaction of MDA [Minnesota 
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The Program has been met with success. As of March 20, 2017, the 
Program boasts 364 certified farms totaling over 211,033 certified acres, 
implementing 628 new best management practices171 that have saved 8.5 
million pounds of soil per year, reduced sediment by 6 million pounds per 
year, and prevented 4 million pounds of phosphorus from entering our 
water.172 
B. Private Sector Recommendations 
Private sector solutions begin with reforming private leases used 
between landowners and tenants, and include creating more private 
incentives through certifications, eco-markets, and conservation easements. 
1. Reform Lease Contracts: Longer Leases 
The lease contract between the landowners and farm operators 
influences several farm operation decisions, such as production, 
conservation, and access to land.173 Tenants advocate for long-term leases 
and lease-to-own agreements to foster land security and to provide for time 
to plan sustainable practices.174 
Although the USDA Survey showed that most landlords have long 
relationships with their tenants, most acres in lease agreements are 
negotiated every year. “Seventy percent of acres rented from operator 
landlords have been rented to the same tenant for over 3 years and 28 
percent for over 10 years.”175 Non-operator landlords frequently have even 
lengthier relationships with their tenants: “84 percent of acres have been 
rented to the same tenant for over 3 years and 41 percent for over 10 
years.”176 And yet, “57 percent of rented acres, accounting for 70 percent of 
lease agreements, are renewed annually,” exhausting “considerable time 
                                                                                                                 
Department of Agriculture] or its agents, sufficient practices utilizing non-structural and non-
permanently landscape-altering management and conservation practices.” Id. 
 171. REDLIN, supra note 167. 
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and effort . . . in managing and negotiating rental contracts.”177 The yearly 
lease also has implications for sustainable practices. 
Economic studies show that some renters do not have incentives to 
invest in management or conservation practices that provide long-term 
benefits.178 In light of the results showing that many tenants are in stable 
tenant-landlord relationships, tenants may have greater long-term 
conservation incentives than previously thought if tenant-landlord 
relationships have lasted many years. In these situations, lengthening leases 
or lease-to-own agreements may be viable options. 
Other contract terms to be amended include leases that allow renters to 
influence decision-makers on sustainable investments. The USDA Survey 
found that owners make all of the decisions on short-term and long-term 
sustainable investments, while renters provide all of the decision-making on 
day-to-day activities and short-term planning.179 Another contract term that 
can be established is to share conservation costs, which landlord 
engagement should do, by lowering the cash-rental rate or selecting a share-
lease (to distribute risk) so that costs and risks associated with required 
conservation practices are not borne entirely by the tenant. 
2. Reform Leases: Add Environmental Stipulations or Sustainability 
Provisions 
A lease outlines the terms of the contract granting an estate in land to a 
tenant for a period of time, and the tenant pays for that right of possession. 
Yet, the action in the lease is not in the conveyance provisions—it is in the 
contract provisions. The contract provisions can serve as a mechanism to 
enact policies regarding sustainable practices. 
Many terms on the lease already bind tenants to conservation 
measures. Since loss of soil through erosion and leaching of nutrients can 
have severe consequences on the value of land for either sale or rental 
purposes, typical leases contain clauses that address protection of soil and 
water quality so that there is no noticeable degradation of soil or water 
quality.180 When drafting a lease, the landlord and tenant discuss questions 
such as what crops can be grown every year, where they can be grown, and 
how much fertilizer and chemicals can be used (with livestock operations, 
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consideration is to be given to the stocking rate and species).181 General 
farming practices include: crop rotation; conservation tillage; no-till 
farming; the use of buffer zones around bodies of water, terraces, and 
ponds; the use of timber stands; the use of organic agriculture; whether to 
have a dedicated wildlife habitat; and whether to qualify for a federal 
CSP.182 
Modern leases also insert sustainability clauses. For example, suppose 
you are a farmer who rents public land in Boulder County, Colorado, and 
profitably grow genetically modified beets with little incentive to plant 
anything else. Boulder County is the largest agricultural landowner and 
lessor of land, with some 25,000 acres of agricultural land in leases 
administered by Boulder County Parks and Open Space.183 In 2011, the 
Boulder County Commission, for the first time, voted to allow farmers to 
plant GMO beets on leased public lands.184 In 2016, after much community 
activism surrounding genetically modified crops, Boulder County updated 
its Cropland Policy to phase-out genetically modified crops on rented land 
for sustainability reasons.185 The Cropland Policy contains provisions 
covering pesticide use and soil health and requirements of “best 
management practices with respect to soil health and quality” (such as 
conservation tillage, soil amendments, cover crops, residue management, 
crop rotation, and rotational grazing).186 In addition, Boulder County 
supports creating lease terms that encourage tenant investment in 
infrastructure to enhance productivity and financial incentives for organic 
agriculture.187 While it may not be possible to replicate this example in 
another setting, especially on large commodity farms, some lessons can be 
learned.188 The development of this model lease and cropland policy is a 
potential solution to leases with sustainability clauses. 
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3. Industry Collaborations and Other Contracting Opportunities That Make 
Sense 
In theory, if a farmer—tenant or landowner—can be guaranteed a 
higher premium for sustainably grown foods, they will be more likely to 
adopt these practices. Traditionally, production contracts (“reached before 
production begins under set compensation formulas, with the contractor 
providing some inputs and owning the commodity from the outset of 
production”) were the mechanism to lock in higher prices.189 To make 
farms profitable—especially for tenants—farmers are finding new 
opportunities to make economic use of their farmland. 
In recent years, new land-related economic opportunities, such as the 
development of carbon credit-related contracts, wind-energy development, 
the sale of conservation easements for farmland protection,190 and long-term 
conservation financing agreements, have proliferated.191 Ecosystem markets 
allow landowners and farmers to receive payments for environmental 
services, similar to the federal CSP program discussed earlier.192 Rather 
than receive payments from the government, businesses in these markets 
pay farmers for stewardship practices that mitigate environmental 
degradation caused by the business, such as carbon emissions or water 
pollution.193 These markets assign an economic value to ecosystem services 
such as erosion control, flood buffers, and clean air.194 In some 
circumstances developers are allowed to pollute or transform a valuable 
habitat as long as the affected ecological services are offset through 
separate habitat preservation, water conservation, or greenhouse gas 
reductions.195 
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Other revenue-generating tools, “private conservation initiatives” 
(PCIs), have developed to encourage farmers to adopt conservation 
practices, improve soil health, and address environmental issues such as 
nitrate loss and climate change.196 The key here is that, while these 
initiatives are for commodities only, most of these initiatives do not have to 
be on owned land.197 And premiums are not guaranteed.198 A PCI has three 
key aspects: (1) it involves private business; (2) it provides an economic 
inducement (monetary or otherwise) for the producer; and (3) it is tied to 
some market-driven, consumer-related sustainability claim.199 Examples of 
Iowa-based PCIs include: (1) United Suppliers’ Sustain initiative using 
Agren’s SoilVantage conservation planning component;200 (2) DuPont 
Pioneer’s Memorandum of Understanding with USDA’s Natural Resource 
Conservation Service Stover Harvest Collection Project;201 (3) POET-
DSM’s “Responsible Stover Harvest” initiative;202 (4) Iowa Seed Corn 
Cover Crops Initiative;203 and (5) Field to Market: The Alliance for 
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Sustainable Agriculture’s “Fieldprint” projects (including Unilever/Archer 
Daniels Midland’s “Iowa Sustainable Soy Fieldprint Project”).204  
The problem with these initiatives is that little evidence exists of direct 
financial rewards for farmers.205 The Unilever Soybean program provides a 
10¢-per-bushel premium to some growers in defined areas.206 The benefits 
are not just financial, and farmers may be using the program to make claims 
about sustainability.207 
Finally, another example of industry-driven practices is the “Climate 
Collaborative,” an initiative among more than 200 manufacturers, retailers, 
distributors, and others who strive “to catalyze bold climate action among 
natural products companies.”208 Member companies such as Annie’s are 
experimenting with “regenerative farming practices like minimized tillage 
and cover cropping, which help draw carbon underground.”209 In doing so, 
they are part of “the Climate Collaborative’s Rooted Community carbon 
farming action group,” sharing their practices with other companies 
industry-wide.210 In 2018, food giant General Mills launched a program to 
“verify the implementation of and measure quantitative results from on-
farm practices that lead to three outcomes of interest: soil health, 
aboveground biodiversity, and farmer economic resilience.”211 While many 
of these programs are new and results have yet to be calculated, the fact that 
farmers are adopting these alternative farming practices to satisfy their 
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upstream contracts suggests that supply chains are a leading motivator for 
the adoption of sustainable practices.   
4. Private Certifications 
While some conservation practices are fixed by local, state, and federal 
regulations, most conservation practices are voluntary. Farmers lock into 
sustainability commitments in at least two ways: through private third-party 
certifications and retailer supply-chain contracts.212  
 First, assisted by state-extension agents, seed companies, cooperatives, 
and consumers, farmers navigate among a sampling of third-party 
certifications: locally grown, organic, antibiotic-free, cage-free, hormone-
free, GMO-free, and fair trade.213 The latest development is a certification 
for regenerative agriculture—one that aims to exceed standards for organic 
agriculture. 214  
 Many certifications address sustainability, several of which focus 
on reduced pesticide use. A recent study conducted by the Consumer 
Reports Food Safety and Sustainability Center215 examined pesticide-
related certifications.216 Among the published results, this study identified 
labels the authors deemed “useful” (e.g., USA Organic,217 Certified 
Naturally Grown, Demeter Biodynamic, Eco Apple, and Eco Stone Fruit) 
because the labels were verified to prohibit all or nearly all pesticides. 
Meanwhile, other standards are deemed “useless” (e.g., natural, pesticide-
free, and Stemilt Responsible Choice) because the labels were not verified 
or tested for pesticide residues.218 Finally, labels where it is “your call” 
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(e.g., Rainforest Alliance, SCS Sustainably Grown, Whole Foods 
Responsibly Grown, and “Food Alliance”) were “verified but less stringent 
in their pesticide rules” than the “useful” labels.219 
While third-party certifications can serve to incentivize sustainable 
practices, this is not always the case. As large farming operations transition 
to organic agriculture to capture the market of eco-consumers desiring more 
sustainable practices, challenges to the USDA Organic label’s legitimacy 
have arisen.220 With less than 1% of farmland in the U.S. certified organic, 
and with organic sales accounting for approximately 4% of the market, 
many object to the difference being made up with food imports.221 The 
USDA Organic certification has also received criticism for not covering 
animal welfare practices and for the variability in adoption of soil-fertility 
techniques.222 
Amidst this controversy, other certification programs are emerging to 
prioritize organic farming practices and soil health, while assuring 
farmworker and other rights.223 This new round of certifications could be 
called: “Organic Plus” programs. The Regenerative Organic Certification, 
for example, has emerged as a holistic agriculture certification 
encompassing pasture-based animal welfare, fairness for farmers and 
workers, and robust requirements for soil health and land management—
which admittedly stretch beyond U.S. standards for organic certification. 224 
These certifications have the potential to help farmers (and their supply 
chains) to meet sustainability and climate-change commitments for 
increasing biodiversity, building soil, and sequestering carbon. Several 
companies (i.e., DanoneWave, Patagonia Provisions, Maple Hill Creamery, 
and Justin’s Nut Butter) are currently developing a pilot program to test 
various systems.225 Instead of going through a third-party certification, 
farmers can opt to contract directly with grocery stores that manage their 
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own labels, such as the Whole Foods’ “Responsibly Grown” label.226 There 
is great variance in grocers—some buy everything from vendors, some 
import some products, some produce their own private label brands, and 
some pursue all three. Consumers may not know that some supermarkets 
engage in rigorous auditing of their vendors and that they place special, 
higher food-safety requirements on their private labels.227 Most 
supermarkets require audits from their growers and suppliers; if suppliers 
do not pass an audit, the contract is dropped.228 As an organization develops 
a sustainability strategy, it moves from first-party strategies (initiatives 
pursued), to second-party strategies (certification schemes), to third-party 
strategies (audits), and finally to fourth-party strategies (codes of 
conduct)—though an organization may use all of these strategies.229   
Private certifications represent a mechanism by which farmers produce 
food to accommodate a private, third-party verified standard, or a private 
retail standard, in an effort to generate additional revenue. The hope is that 
certification programs, like the USDA Organic program, will succeed in 
giving farmers a premium for organic production before and after their crop 
is harvested. This means that other certification programs will provide 
farmers with incentives similar to those that major food brands like General 
Mills, Kellogg, and Ardent Mills provide to USDA Organic farmers. 
“General Mills, for instance, recently signed a deal to help convert about 
3,000 [conventional agriculture] acres to organic production of alfalfa and 
other animal feeds,” while “Ardent offers farmers a premium for crops 
grown on land while a farm transitions to organic.”230 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article presented many solutions for incentivizing sustainable 
practice adoption, while specifically addressing the pivotal role of tenant 
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farmers in the food system. This is important given that tenancy is 
forecasted to rise in the next twenty years, as farmers retire and more acres 
move both into tenancy and into the hands of landlords with no farming 
experience. Recommendations were provided for both regulators seeking to 
promote sustainability (through federal, state, and municipal rules and 
programs) and for farmers exploring sustainable practices (from negotiating 
leases to private certifications and industry collaborations). 
Outside of the solutions presented, work remains to be done in terms of 
disseminating information between tenants, landowners who farm the land, 
and landowners who own land with no background in farming per se. More 
farm and agricultural extension-level programs need to develop curricula to 
incorporate sustainable practices consistent with food safety goals or “co-
management” farming practices that promote food safety and sustainability. 
There is also a need for more succession and farm-conservation planning 
for landowners and tenants to encourage consideration of on-farm 
conservation and productive land transfer for generations to come.  
Finally, research on the price premium offered by certification 
programs is necessary to show farmers that sustainable practices provide a 
return on investment. In addition, an expansion of state legislative programs 
favoring conservation (e.g., Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality 
Certification Program) and industry collaborations that provide farmers 
with funding to undergo organic certification (e.g., those by General Mills 
and Ardent Farms) will be critical as farmers strive to adopt sustainable 
practices.   
 
